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A Disability Act? The Vaccine Damage Payments
Act 1979 and the British Government’s Response to
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Summary. The Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979 provided a lump-sum social security benefit to
children who had become severely disabled as a result of vaccination. It came in the wake of a scare
over the safety of the whooping cough (pertussis) vaccine. Yet very little has been written about it.
Existing literature focuses more on the public health and medical aspects of both the Act and the
scare. This article uses material from the archives of disability organisations and official documents
to show that this Act should be seen as part of the history of post-war British disability policy. By
framing it thus, we can learn more about why the government responded in the specific way that it
did, as well as shed new light on public attitudes towards vaccination and disability.
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In the mid-1970s, a group of British parents claimed that their children had become dis-
abled as a result of government-recommended vaccinations. Although their complaints
covered a range of diseases, it was the whooping cough—pertussis—vaccine that cap-
tured the public imagination. Sections of the medical community backed the parents’ po-
sition, and the vaccination rate for pertussis plummeted. The confusion was such that
when the government was advised by its own expert bodies that a major publicity cam-
paign was necessary to avoid a whooping cough epidemic, it declined to do so until it
had received the results of epidemiological studies into the safety of the vaccination pro-
gramme. In an attempt to restore confidence, the Labour government forced through
legislation that would provide payments of £10,000 to those who could show that their
children had been damaged. But this was too late to avoid a pertussis epidemic in the
winter of 1978/79.
The Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) engaged in a two-pronged de-
fence of the vaccination programme. First, its advisory bodies the Committee on the
Safety of Medicines and the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation (JCVI) re-
viewed the evidence on the safety and efficacy of the pertussis vaccine. Second, to re-
store public trust it passed the Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979 to provide social
security payments to families of damaged children. The former has received attention
from historians and researchers of public health. The latter, however, has been largely
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ignored, or presented as part of the medical establishment’s response to the ‘pertussis
vaccine scare’. As this article demonstrates, such analyses overlook the crucial influence
of contemporary political factors. In particular, developments in disability policy and the
position of disabled people fuelled and, in turn, provided some of the tools for respond-
ing to the crisis.
Disability, Vaccination and Social History
The current historiography on the whooping cough crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s
has focused on the public health ramifications. This has meant that the primary source
materials and analytical focus have been predominantly medical or concerned with the
minutiae of public health policy. Yet the events are better explained through the prevail-
ing political and social context. This is by no means a new approach to the history of
medicine. Porter and Porter, for example, have shown that opposition to compulsory
smallpox vaccination in the nineteenth century was tied into a number of cultural atti-
tudes towards poverty and pauperism, as well as scepticism over the truth claims of the
emerging fields of epidemiology and public health.1 On the disability side, Borsay has
shown how disabled people were institutionalised during the modern period; but at the
same time, many participated in public and private pursuits. This has provided a richer
view of how health status and concepts such as disability and capacity were understood
in modern British society.2 By highlighting the disability aspects of the Vaccine Damage
Payments Act 1979, we can better understand reactions to both public health and dis-
ability issues in the post-war era. The Act was explicitly framed using disability legislation,
telling us much about the legal framework derived from a definition of disability that had
evolved from earlier decades. The catalyst was a medical scandal, born in the wake of
the thalidomide crisis and played out in the political discourse of the period. This is, there-
fore, an opportunity to see public anxieties over acute and chronic health concerns in
action.
Work has been done on public and organised opposition to smallpox vaccination in
the nineteenth century, and has included debates over class, religion, scientific consensus
and the rights of individuals versus the collective.3 Many of these themes continued into
1Dorothy Porter and Roy Porter, ‘The Politics of
Prevention: Anti-vaccinationism and Public Health in
Nineteenth-century England’, Medical History, 1988,
32, 231–52. Other investigations in smallpox and the
Vaccination Acts include E. P. Hennock, ‘Vaccination
Policy Against Smallpox, 1835–1914: A Comparison
of England with Prussia and Imperial Germany’, Social
History of Medicine, 1998, 11, 49–71; Ann Clark,
‘Compliance with Infant Smallpox Vaccination
Legislation in Nineteenth-century Rural England:
Hollingbourne, 1876–88’, Social History of Medicine,
2004, 17, 175–98; Michael Bennett, ‘Jenner’s Ladies:
Women and Vaccination against Smallpox in Early
Nineteenth-Century Britain’, History, 2008, 93, 497–
513.
2Anne Borsay, Disability and Social Policy (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Again, recent studies have
investigated the lives of children, disability cam-
paigners and how war veterans were ‘rehabilitated’.
See: Julie Anderson, War, Disability and Rehabilitation
in Britain (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
2011); Michael Mantin, ‘Educational Experiences of
Deaf Children in Wales: The Cambrian Institution for
the Deaf and Dumb, 1847–1914’ (unpublished PhD
thesis, Swansea University, 2012); Jameel Hampton,
‘Discovering Disability: The General Classes of
Disabled People and the Classic Welfare State, 1948–
1964’, Historian, 2013, 75.
3Porter and Porter, ‘The Politics of Prevention’; Nadja
Durbach, Bodily Matters: The Anti-Vaccination
Movement in England, 1853–1907 (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2004); Nelson Marie Clark and
John Rogers, ‘The right to die? Anti-vaccination activ-
ity and the 1874 smallpox epidemic in Stockholm’,
Social History of Medicine, 1992, 5, 369–88.
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the twentieth century, as has been shown with other emerging immunisation techniques
and how they were accepted by their target population.4 However, immunisation in post-
war Britain is much less studied from a historical perspective.5 For whooping cough in par-
ticular, we are left with mainly medical and epidemiological analyses rather than political
or social history. These locate the controversy almost exclusively within public health prac-
tice and policy. This ignores much of the contemporary political climate, including the
growing disability movement, sweeping reforms to social security benefits for disabled
people, the legacy of the recent thalidomide scandal and a deepening financial crisis. As a
result, the scare has been somewhat dehistoricised and placed in the context of proceed-
ing. Broadly, this has created two types of analysis. The first uses the pertussis vaccination
and incidence data from the 1970s and 1980s to show that the epidemics of 1979 and
1982 were much larger than at any point before or since the introduction of a routine
diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (DTP) vaccine in 1957.6 The scare is therefore presented as a
cautionary tale of the risks of allowing fear of vaccine safety to grow amongst the public,
as well as evidence for the efficacy of mass vaccination programmes. The second type of
analysis draws parallels with the later MMR controversy of the late 1990s and early
2000s.7 This is problematic, because both scares were produced in very specific historical
conditions. Instead, they are thought equivalent because the central concern of these
studies is how to measure the effects of declining vaccination rates. Both these forms of
analysis gloss over the political and social context of the period, and take as granted the
hindsight that the pertussis vaccination was declared safe in the early 1980s.8 Further,
they tend to disregard the historical importance of the scare in its own right in favour of
wider practical questions about public health and vaccination. For public health practi-
tioners, the scandal represents ‘bad science’, to borrow a term, in a world that is more
prone to focus on the ‘lesson of history’ for concrete action rather than to understand the
motives of policy actors within their own specific historical context.9
4See: Anne Hardy, ‘Straight Back to Barbarism: Anti-ty-
phoid Inoculation and the Great War, 1914’, Bulletin
of the History of Medicine, 2000, 74, 265–90; Jane
Lewis, ‘The Prevention of Diphtheria in Canada and
Britain 1914–1945’, Journal of Social History, 1986,
20, 163–76.
5Notable exceptions concern Bacillus Calmette-Gue´rin
(BCG), Heaptitis B policy, and a growing interest in
polio. Linda Bryder, ‘“We shall not find salvation in in-
oculation”’, Social Science & Medicine, 1999, 49,
1157–67; Jennifer Stanton, ‘What Shapes Vaccine
Policy?’, Social History of Medicine, 1994, 7, 427–46;
Gareth Williams, Paralysed with Fear: The Story of
Polio (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Ulrike
Lindner and Stuart S. Blume, ‘Vaccine Innovation and
Adoption: Polio Vaccines in the UK, the Netherlands
and West Germany, 1955–1965’, Medical History,
2006, 50, 425–46.
6G. Amirthalingam, S. Gupta and H. Campbell,
‘Pertussis Immunisation and Control in England and
Wales, 1957 to 2012: A Historical Review’, Euro
Surveillance, 2013, 18; Maria A. Riolo, Aaron A. King
and Pejman Rohani, ‘Can Vaccine Legacy Explain the
British Pertussis Resurgence?’, Vaccine, 2013, 31,
5903–8.
7Chris T. Bauch and Samit Bhattacharyya, ‘Evolutionary
Game Theory and Social Learning Can Determine
How Vaccine Scares Unfold’, PLoS Computational
Biology, 2012, 8, 1–12; Rachel Casiday, ‘Risk
Communication in the British Pertussis and MMR
Vaccine Controversies’, in Peter Bennett, Kenneth
Calman, Sarah Curtis and Denis Fischbacher-Smith,
eds, Risk Communication and Public Health (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010), 129–46; Rachel
Casiday, ‘Risk and Trust in Vaccine Decision Making’,
Durham Anthropology Journal, 2005, 13.
8Jeffrey P. Baker, ‘The Pertussis Vaccine Controversy in
Great Britain, 1974–1986’, Vaccine, 2003, 21, 4003–
10; Department of Health and Social Security,
Committee on Safety of Medicines, and Joint
Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation,
Whooping Cough (London: HMSO, 1981).
9Virginia Berridge, Public Health in History
(Maidenhead: Open University Press, October 2011),
213–16; Virginia Berridge, ‘History Matters?’, Medical
History, 2008, 52, 311–26; Ben Goldacre, Bad Science
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For these reasons, it is important for historians to look beyond the medical sphere. As
Drakeford and Butler have shown, ‘scandals’ such as this are manufactured to a certain
extent.10 The mere existence of morally offensive action is not enough; it needs to be ar-
ticulated through public discourse.11 This is true not just of a scandal, but also of the spe-
cific responses that are chosen by policy makers. Kingdon has noted that policy action
requires the confluence of a perceived problem, the political will to act, and the technical
capacity to respond.12 That is to say, it was neither inevitable that the knowledge of vac-
cine damage would turn into the scandal that it did; nor that the Vaccine Damage
Payments Act would be one of the policy results. The pertussis scare occurred at a crucial
time in disability politics in which both Labour and Conservative governments had en-
acted a range of policies aimed at improving the lives of disabled people. Disability was
being seen as a social issue as well as (if not instead of) a medical one; and it had become
a branch of policy with its own machinery for creating solutions to policy problems.13
Further, a voluntary organization in the form of the Association of Parents of Vaccine
Damaged Children was able to convince medical, state and private institutions that their
favoured solution to the problem—statutory compensation—was the morally correct
course of action.
The Vaccine Damage Payments Act has received relatively little scrutiny of this type
partly because it is, historically speaking, a recent event. The traditional ‘thirty-year rule’
at The National Archives means that much of the material upon which this article is based
has only been publicly available for a few years. Moreover, disability histories are them-
selves relatively new.14 Histories of welfare provision have tended to focus on the wider
‘rediscovery of poverty’ and the politics of ‘consensus’ in the 1960s and 1970s which
provided a fertile environment for extending the welfare state to groups excluded from
the post-war settlement.15 Recent work has shed light on the lives of disabled people
(London: Harper Perennial, 2009). For histories of so-
cial welfare provision, see: Bernard Harris, The Origins
of the British Welfare State: Society, State and Social
Welfare in England and Wales, 1800–1945
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Howard
Glennerster, British Social Policy, 1945 to the Present,
3rd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007); David Gladstone,
‘Renegotiating the Boundaries: Risk and Responsibility
in Personal Welfare since 1945’, in Helen Fawcett and
Rodney Lowe, eds, Welfare Policy in Britain: The Road
from 1945 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 34–51.
10Mark Drakeford and Ian Butler, Scandal, Social Policy
and Social Welfare (Bristol: Policy Press, 2005).
11Mark Drakeford and Ian Butler, ‘Everyday Tragedies:
Justice, Scandal and Young People in Contemporary
Britain’, The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice,
2007, 46, 219–35.
12John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public
Policies, 2nd edn (New York: Longman, 1995);
Gareth Millward, ‘Invalud Definitions, Invalid
Responses: Disability and the Welfare State, 1965–
1995’ (unpublished PhD thesis, London School of
Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, 2014).
13The DHSS had created the post of Minister for the
Disabled in 1974, while governments since the mid-
1960s had dedicated much administrative time to
the question of disability benefits and access to ser-
vices. See Gareth Millward, ‘Social Security Policy
and the Early Disability Movement—Expertise,
Disability, and the Government, 1965–77’,
Twentieth Century British History, 2015, 26, 274–97.
14For a historiographical review, see: Julie Anderson
and Ana Carden-Coyne, ‘Enabling the Past: New
Perspectives in the History of Disability’, European
Review of History, 2007, 14, 447–57, and other arti-
cles in this special edition; Anne Borsay, ‘History and
Disability Studies: Evolving Perspectives’, in Nick
Watson, Alan Roulstone and Carol Thomas,
Routledge Handbook of Disability Studies (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2012), 324–35; Catherine J. Kudlick,
‘Disability History: Why We Need Another “Other”’,
The American Historical Review, 2003, 108, 763–93.
15Rodney Lowe, The Welfare State in Britain since
1945 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005);
Glennerster, British Social Policy; Derek Fraser, The
Evolution of the British Welfare State (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
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and the various institutions which governed their lives.16 This has begun to include dis-
cussions of the social construction of impairment and the differing experiences of dis-
abled people.17 This journal has also shown a growing interest in the implications for the
social history of medicine.18 But this relatively new endeavour has only just begun to in-
vestigate the period after 1970. As such, there is very little on the two big disability com-
pensation crises of the decade—thalidomide and vaccine damage. Memoirs and
biographical material of the major players have been produced in which the campaigners
narrate their side of the story, yet there is almost nothing on how these affected the posi-
tion of ‘disability’ as a social and legal concept.19 Jameel Hampton has discussed the
quandary confronted by the Disablement Income Group (DIG) when faced with the
claims by the thalidomide parents, but by ending his study of British disability policy in
1975 he does not tackle vaccine damage.20 Similarly, Claire Sewell’s work on the parents
of disabled children is analysed in the wake of the thalidomide crisis, but does this to
draw wider conclusions about parenting, childhood and the concept of ‘the carer’.21
Other than Jeffrey Baker’s overview of the pertussis vaccine controversy and its effects on
American anti-vaccination campaigns, there is no investigation into the primary material
surrounding the Vaccine Damage Payments Act and its significance in British disability
policy.22
This article argues that by placing the Act in this wider political and social discussion,
historians can learn more about why the government responded as it did to the whoop-
ing cough scare. Campaigners successfully used the tactics of other voluntary organiza-
tions to press their case to the public. They were able to draw on both the successes of
16See in particular: Anne Borsay and Pamela Dale (eds),
Disabled Children: Contested Caring, 1850–1979
(London: Pickering & Chatto, 2012); David M. Turner
and Kevin Stagg (eds), Social Histories of Disability
and Deformity (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006); Nick
Watson (ed.), Disability: Major Themes in Health and
Social Welfare (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008); Sonali
Shah and Mark Priestley, Disability and Social
Change: Private Lives and Public Bodies (Bristol: Policy
Press, 2011).
17Helen Bolderson, Social Security, Disability and
Rehabilitation (London: Jessica Kingsley, 1991);
Borsay, Disability and Social Policy; Julie Anderson,
War, Disability and Rehabilitation; Hampton,
‘Discovering Disability’.
18Ben Curtis and Stephen Thompson, ‘“A Plentiful
Crop of Cripples Made by all this Progress”:
Disability, Artificial Limbs and Working-class
Mutualism in the South Wales Coalfield, 1890–
1948’, Social History of Medicine, 2014, 27, 708–27;
Alistair Ritch, ‘English Poor Law Institutional Care for
Older People: Identifying the “Aged and Infirm” and
the “Sick” in Birmingham Workhouse, 1852–1912’,
Social History of Medicine, 2014, 27, 64–85; Heli
Leppa¨la¨, ‘Duty to Entitlement: Work and Citizenship
in the Finnish Post-war Disability Policy, early 1940s
to 1970’, Social History of Medicine, 2014, 27, 144–
64; Gwen A. Parsons, ‘The Construction of Shell
Shock in New Zealand, 1919–1939: A
Reassessment’, Social History of Medicine, 2013, 26,
56–73; Laura L. Phillips, ‘Gendered Dis/ability:
Perspectives from the Treatment of Psychiatric
Casualties in Russia’s early Twentieth-century Wars’,
Social History of Medicine, 2007, 20, 333–50; Beth
Linker, ‘Feet for Fighting: Locating Disability and
Social Medicine in First World War America’, Social
History of Medicine, 2007, 20, 91–109; and passim.
19For thalidomide see: Jack Ashley, Acts of Defiance
(London: Reinhardt, 1992); The Sunday Times, Suffer
the Children: The Story of Thalidomide (New York:
Viking Press, 1979); Mary Wilkinson, Defying
Disability (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2009), 35–56;
David Mason, Thalidomide (London: Allen and
Unwin, 1976); Louise Medus, Laughing and Loving—
A Thalidomide Survivor’s Story (Pembroke Dock:
Accent Press, 2009). For vaccine damage see:
Rosemary Fox, Helen’s Story (London: John Blake,
2006); Wilkinson, Defying Disability, 35–56; Ashley,
Acts of Defiance.
20Jameel Hampton, ‘Disabled People and the Classic
Welfare State’ (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of
Bristol, 2011).
21Claire Sewell, ‘“If one member of the family is dis-
abled the family as a whole is disabled”: Thalidomide
Children and the Emergence of the Family Carer in
Britain, c. 1957–1978’, Family and Community
History (2015), 18, 37–52.
22Baker, ‘The Pertussis Vaccine Controversy’.
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the poverty lobby over the 1960s and recent health scandals which remained fresh in the
memory. Importantly, the specific framework of the Act drew heavily on existing disabil-
ity policies and definitions. It is only by moving beyond the existing medical narratives
that we can access this history. To go further, even though the Act has not been part of
the traditional narrative of disability policy, we can understand much about government
attitudes towards disability through the provisions contained within the Act.
The Association of Parents of Vaccine Damaged Children
The Association of Parents of Vaccine Damaged Children (hereafter the Association) was
formed in 1973 by two mothers who blamed their children’s brain damage on the polio-
myelitis vaccine. A piece in the Birmingham Post in June 1973 on the subject of vaccine
damage included a call from Rosemary Fox and Renee Lennon to establish a new soci-
ety.23 By the time their story was published in a Guardian article in August, this society
was calling itself the Association.24 Fox and the Association became the public face of
the campaign to provide compensation for victims of vaccine damage.
In many ways, the Association drew on the tactics and successes of earlier disability or-
ganisations. Unlike others in the ‘poverty lobby’ or ‘welfare rights’ sphere, it was largely a
single-issue group. DIG became the first pan-impairment disability organisation to lobby
central government in 1965.25 Other voluntary organisations at this time concerned
themselves with specific impairments or groups of conditions—notable examples being
the Spastics Society and MENCAP—or were charities providing care for disabled
people—such as Leonard Cheshire.26 DIG’s concern was wide-ranging, and included a
complete reformulation of the social security system with regard to disabled people. It
established a campaign for a National Disability Income, an ideal social security benefit
that would compensate disabled people for the lost earnings and additional costs associ-
ated with living with single or multiple impairments.27 In 1974, the Disability Alliance
would promote a similar campaign led by prominent sociologist and poverty campaigner
Professor Peter Townsend.28
The Association, however, focused solely on the issue of compensation for vaccine
damaged children. This demand for special treatment was politically problematic. Both
DIG and the Disability Alliance argued against the system, which had developed after the
Second World War and gave preferential treatment to certain categories of disabled peo-
ple. Claimants with National Insurance records or those injured in industrial accidents or
the armed forces were entitled to higher levels of benefit; while married women qualified
23See The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA) MH
154/1053, ‘“Society should compensate for brain
damage”’, Birmingham Post, 26 June 1973 [page
numbers omitted].
24Mary McCormack, ‘The Hazards of Health’, The
Guardian, 3 August 1973, 11. See also Fox, Helen’s
Story.
25Hampton, ‘Disabled People and the Classic Welfare
State’; Campbell and Oliver, Disability Politics.
26Since 1994, the Spastics Society has been called
Scope. See: ibid.; Pat Thane, ‘Voluntary Action in
Britain since Beveridge’, in Melanie Oppenheimer
and Nicholas Deakin, eds, Beveridge and Voluntary
Action in Britain and the Wider British World
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011),
121–34.
27Disablement Income Group, Creating a National
Disability Income (London: DIG, 1972); Hampton,
‘Disabled People and the Classic Welfare State’;
Millward, ‘Social Security Policy and the Early
Disability Movement’.
28Disability Alliance, Poverty and Disability (London:
Disability Alliance, 1975); Howard Glennerster, ‘Peter
Townsend’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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for no benefits at all. Moreover, the system was designed to provide temporary cover
for sickness and unemployment rather than the specific effects of chronic illness. This
approach remained most prominent throughout the 1970s,29 but it was already coming
under scrutiny from more radical opponents. Social security was seen by the Union of the
Physically Impaired Against Segregation as a symptom of disability, not the root cause of
why disabled people were discriminated against. Drawing on feminist and black critiques
of sexism and racism, it directly challenged the dominant ‘medical model’—whereby
most political and cultural institutions defined disabled people by medical diagnoses, or
what was ‘wrong’ with their bodies and minds. A new social model was proposed in
which people were said to be disabled by society.30 For example—a person is not dis-
abled because they cannot climb stairs; they are disabled because buildings are designed
for an assumed level of capacity in which everyone can climb stairs. Thus, the focus of
disability policy should not be on manipulating the individual to walk (necessarily), but
should instead look to install escalators and lifts in public buildings so that everyone has
access to core services.31 While these groups did not gain significant public attention
until the 1980s, it must be noted that the Association’s focus on the specific medical
problems of their members’ children went against many of the political developments of
the decade.
Until the financial crises of the Callaghan years restricted government expenditure, the
campaigns for disability benefits were largely successful. DIG and the Disability Alliance
became frustrated at the slow rate of progress, but after the passing of the Social
Security Benefits Act 1975, most of the groups that DIG had campaigned for were now
covered by at least some sort of benefit.32 The outgoing Wilson government in 1970 at-
tempted to create a limited invalidity pension, but the National Superannuation and
National Insurance Bill was lost to the general election. Such was the political consensus
on the matter, however, that the new Heath administration quickly established Invalidity
Benefit and Attendance Allowance to help unemployed disabled people and the cost of
caring for a disabled relative respectively. When it returned to power, Labour created
benefits for housewives, the costs of transport and a non-contributory version of
Invalidity Benefit in 1975. Campaigners had managed to secure statements from succes-
sive Secretaries of State for Social Services that, once the economy recovered, the system
would be reformed and improved upon.33 For the Association, this meant that it was
widely accepted that monetary payments were an important facet of social policy for
29Campbell and Oliver, Disability Politics, 55; Millward,
‘Social Security Policy and the Early Disability
Movement’.
30This was first properly articulated in Oliver, Politics of
Disablement. However, its roots are deeper. See Paul
Hunt, Stigma (London: G. Chapman, 1966); The
Disability Archive, University of Leeds: Union of the
Physically Imapaired Against Segregation and The
Disability Alliance, Fundamental Principles of Disability
<http://disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/library/UPIAS-
fundamental-principles.pdf>, accessed 13 August
2015; Victor Finkelstein, Attitudes and Disabled People:
Issues for Discussion (New York: International
Exchange of Information in Rehabilitation, 1980); Tom
Shakespeare, Disability Rights and Wrongs (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2006).
31Victor Finkelstein’s story about the only non-wheel-
chair user in a world of wheelchair users is a good il-
lustrative example. See: Victor Finkelstein, ‘Phase 2:
Discovering the Person in “Disability” and
“Rehabilitation”’, Magic Carpet, 1975, 27, 31–8.
32Millward, ‘Social Security Policy and the Early
Disability Movement’.
33Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 767, 24 July
1969, 2158; ibid., 846, 14 November 1972, 96;
ibid., 881, 21 November 1974, 1558.
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disabled people; and that there was a growing set of precedents upon which a compen-
sation scheme could be built.
The result of this growing movement was a wider consideration of the needs of dis-
abled people, and parliamentarians were beginning to specialise in this area of policy. This
gave the Association the opportunity to build alliances with sympathetic figures in
Westminster. In 1969, Alfred Morris introduced the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons
Bill. When it received Royal Assent the following year, it was the first such Act of its kind
in the world, giving powers to local authorities to provide services for disabled people.34
While it never had the powers of compulsion that Morris and the Bill’s supporters had
hoped for, it meant that after the February 1974 General Election Morris became the
world’s first Minister for the Disabled.35 He had been helped by the creation of the All
Party Group on Disablement, founded by Jack Ashley (Labour, Stoke-on-Trent South) and
John Astor (Conservative, Newbury).36 Ashley was central to the Association’s activities in
Westminster. He was also disabled, deaf as a result of an infection he had contracted after
surgery on his ears. In 1974 he became Parliamentary Private Secretary to Barbara Castle
(Secretary of State for Social Services), which gave the Association an opportunity to speak
directly to the head of the DHSS.37 Even when Ashley left his post, his relationship with
Morris and new Secretary of State David Ennals ensured that the issue remained on the
agenda. This is evidenced not only by the correspondence between Ashley and the DHSS
during the 1970s but the involvement of the three men in meetings with Conservative
ministers over the Vaccine Damage Payments Scheme in the early 1980s.38
Most crucially of all, disability was seen as a social category and a matter of policy.39
Yet the rhetoric had been based around equal treatment based on need, not on cause of
impairment. The Association was trying to argue that it was a ‘special case’.40 The recent
thalidomide crisis gave campaigners an analogous medical scandal that could be ex-
ploited. The Sunday Times campaign for full compensation from the drug’s manufac-
turers had only just concluded, pursued vigorously by Jack Ashley in parliament. In its
wake, the Heath government created the Family Fund to provide payments to ‘congeni-
tally disabled children’.41 The experience had made the public and medical establishment
wary about the dangers that could be posed by drugs and treatments presumed to be
safe.42 As a result, The Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for
Personal Injury added medical negligence to its remit.43 Chaired by Lord Pearson, it was
34Eda Topliss and Bryan Gould, A Charter for the
Disabled (Oxford: B. Blackwell & M. Robertson, 1981).
35Alfred Morris and Arthur Butler, No Feet to Drag: Report
on the Disabled (London: Macmillan, 1972); Derek
Kinrade, Alf Morris: People’s Parliamentarian: Scenes
from the Life of Lord Morris of Manchester (London:
National Information Forum, 2007), esp. 155–82.
36He was, for instance, the Labour vice president of
DIG. See Ashley, Acts of Defiance; Beth Capper, A
Celebration of the Work of the APPDG (London:
RADAR, 2008), 12.
37Fox, Helen’s Story, 57–61.
38See correspondence with Ashley in TNA: BN 13/360;
and also TNA: BN 124/20, Meeting on the Vaccine
Damage Payments Scheme, 16 June 1981.
39Millward, ‘Invalid Definitions, Invalid Responses’.
40Fox, Helen’s Story, 88.
41Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 847, 29
November 1972, 446.
42See: Hampton, ‘Disabled People and the Classic
Welfare State’; Derek Kinrade, Alf Morris (London:
National Information Forum, 2007), 207–18; Ashley,
Acts of Defiance; The Sunday Times, Suffer the
Children; Medus, Laughing and Loving.
43Colin Pearson, Royal Commission on Civil Liability and
Compensation for Personal Injury, vol. 1 (Cmnd.
7054–I) (London: HMSO, 1978), specifically quotes
thalidomide cases as one of the reasons for its
appointment.
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primarily concerned with the current system of accident compensation, including indus-
trial injuries following the earlier Robens Report into Health and Safety.44 Thalidomide
had also made the parents of disabled children more visible, even if, as Sewell argues, it
had not resulted in a fundamental shift in public attitudes or their legal status.45 By simul-
taneously claiming that the Family Fund did not provide adequate coverage, and appeal-
ing to the potential for another thalidomide-like scandal, the Association could make its
specific claims for compensation.
The Vaccine Damage Campaign
The Association’s breakthrough in 1973 came as a result of Fox’s campaigning and the
recent publication of an article in the British Medical Journal (BMJ) which argued:
The moral justification for compensation . . . is based on the social contract.
National immunization programmes not only aim to protect the individual but also
to protect society. . . . If individuals are asked to accept a risk (even a very small
one) partly for the benefit of society then it seems equitable that society should
compensate the victims of occasional unlucky mishaps.46
‘Protect[ing] society’ had taken on a dual meaning. In the short-term, vaccination policy
had been focused on preventing infectious disease; but it had also come to mean protec-
tion from disability. While early public health interventions had focused more on infec-
tious diseases, the relative increase of chronic disease had seen a shift in priorities.47
Vaccination was still seen as an important tool against infectious diseases such as diph-
theria and tuberculosis, but immunisations against poliomyelitis and rubella were driven
by concerns over the public and private costs of disabled children surviving into adult-
hood. The campaign against rubella, particularly aimed at women of child-bearing age,
was regularly cited throughout the 1970s as part of the government’s disability policy.48
Similarly, the request for monetary ‘compensation’ was entirely consistent with demands
from welfare rights organisations and the recent success of the parents of children
affected by thalidomide.
Fox’s daughter, Helen, had received the polio vaccine in the early 1960s and soon af-
terwards showed signs of brain damage. She began to have fits and, by the time of the
campaign, was eleven years old with a diagnosed mental age of three. Believing that the
vaccine had caused this behaviour, Fox and the other parents were angered by the atti-
tude of the profession, with many doctors refusing to acknowledge that vaccination
could lead to damage at all. They began to collect detailed medical information from
Association members to make their case to the medical authorities.49 This had been a
core tactic among welfare rights organisations. The Child Poverty Action Group and DIG
44A. Robens, Safety and Health at Work, Report of the
Committee (Cmnd. 5034) (London: HMSO, 1972).
45Sewell, ‘Thalidomide Children and the Emergence of
the Family Carer’.
46Anon., ‘Help for Victims of Immunizations’, Br Med
J., 1973, 1, 758.
47Virginia Berridge, Martin Gorsky and Alex Mold,
Public Health in History (Maidenhead: Open
University Press, 2011), 195–210.
48Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 766, 20 June
1968, 1294–5; ibid., 795, 11 February 1970, 1356–
7; ibid., 914, 8 July 1976, 1979; ibid., 957, 7
November 1978, 110–2W; Parliamentary Debates
(Lords) 317, 7 April 1971, 376–7.
49See in particular Fox’s autobiography in which she
details the campaign from her perspective. Fox,
Helen’s Story.
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had collected information from members and those it sought to help in order to be able
to provide illustrative examples of the difficulties suffered by those who could not access
help from the welfare authorities.50
The majority view of the medical establishment was that vaccines were safe and effec-
tive measures of disease prevention. A large trial of 36,000 subjects in 1957 conducted
by the Medical Research Council had shown the pertussis vaccine to be safe and effec-
tive, with no cases of brain damage.51 But the parents were not ‘fobbed off’ by every-
one.52 In particular, Professor Gordon Stewart and Dr John Wilson offered their support
to the campaign. A letter to The Guardian by Drs J. V. T. Gosling and J. H. Moseley al-
leged that the pertussis vaccine was not effective enough to be worth administering.
They also made reference to some cases of brain damage that might be linked to its
use.53 This was pressed further in 1974 by Wilson and colleagues at Great Ormond Street
Hospital, who alleged a link between brain-damaged children and the whooping cough
vaccine.54 ‘People seem to worry’, Fox told The Guardian, ‘doctors in particular, that they
may get themselves involved in another highly publicised thalidomide episode’.55
It would also not have been the first high-profile instance of damage to children en
masse from vaccination. The American Cutter Incident, in which thousands of children
were injected with live polio virus as the result of a faulty batch of the new Salk vaccine,
had occurred less than 20 years previously.56 This led the Association to make a tactical
decision and focus its efforts on pertussis. Not only did many of its members (around
two-thirds) blame the vaccine for their children’s injuries, there was a growing literature
that suggested that there was hard evidence for their case.57 Professor George Dick, a
member of the JCVI, had noted in 1973 that he had evidence for around 80 cases of
damage from the vaccine per year.58 By 1977, Gordon Stewart’s claims that it was safer
to catch pertussis than receive the inoculation reflected how much attention had been
brought to the subject in the media and the medical community.59 Although there was
never consensus that the vaccine was dangerous, enough doubt had been sown for
there to be a genuine debate.
50Whiteley and Winyard, Pressure for the Poor: The
Poverty Lobby and Policy Making (London: Methuen,
1987); Matthew Hilton, James McKay, Nicholas
Crowson and Jean-Franc¸ois Mouhot, The Politics of
Expertise: How NGOs Shaped Modern Britain
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), esp. 133–5;
Matthew Hilton, Nick Crowson, Jean-Franc¸ois
Mouhot and James McKay, A Historical Guide to
NGOs in Britain: Charities, Civil Society and the
Voluntary Sector since 1945 (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2012), 122–5.
51‘Vaccination against Whooping-cough’, Br Med J.,
1956, 2, 454.
52This had been a core complaint in the interview with
the Guardian. Mary McCormack, ‘The Hazards of
Health’, The Guardian, 3 August 1973, 11.
53J. V. T. Gosling and J. H. Moseley, ‘To Jab or Not to
Jab?’, The Guardian, 20 August 1973, 9.
54M. Kulenkampff, J. S. Schwartzman and J. Wilson,
‘Neurological Complications of Pertussis Inoculation’,
Archives of Disease in Childhood, 1974, 49, 46–9.
55McCormack, ‘The Hazards of Health’, 11.
56This created ripples across the developed world. See:
Per Axelsson, ‘The Cutter Incident and the
Development of a Swedish Polio Vaccine, 1952–
1957’, Dynamis, 2012, 32, 311–28; Alison Day, ‘“An
American Tragedy”. The Cutter Incident and its
Implications for the Salk Polio Vaccine in New
Zealand 1955–1960’, Health & History: Journal of the
Australian & New Zealand Society for the History of
Medicine, 2009, 11, 42–61.
57As of January 1977, Fox claimed to have 281 cases
of damage, of which 182 were blamed on pertussis.
Hugh Herbert, ‘Parents Gain Ground in Medical
Fight’, The Guardian, 6 January 1977, 6. See also:
Fox, Helen’s Story; DHSS et al., Whooping Cough.
58William Breckon, ‘A Vaccinating Question’, The
Guardian, 29 August 1973, 9.
59G. Stewart, ‘Vaccination against Whooping-cough’,
Lancet, 1977, 1, 234–7; ‘Rush for Cough Vaccine
“could do harm”, The Guardian, 19 December
1977, 2; Baker, ‘The Pertussis Vaccine Controversy’.
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Parliamentarians became interested in the crisis, and the Association’s rising profile
saw both the Heath and Wilson governments of the mid-1970s forced to refute allega-
tions of medical negligence or a cover up.60 A succession of Early Day Motions, signed by
dozens of MPs, suggest at least “soft” support for the campaign’s broad goal of provid-
ing compensation for accident victims.61 Parliamentary questions from many MPs, but
particularly Jack Ashley and Robert Adley (Conservative, Bristol North East until February
1974, then Christchurch and Lymington), pressed the government to release more infor-
mation and to conduct further enquiries and tests into vaccine safety.62 In 1977, Ashley
referred a complaint to the Parliamentary Commissioner, Sir Idwal Pugh, on behalf of the
Association. Fox and Ashley argued that the health services had
failed to make available to parents all the information they should have taken into
account before they agreed to have their children vaccinated against whooping
cough (pertussis). Mrs Fox added that she felt medical practitioners and health visi-
tors were generally ill-informed about the conditions which made it inadvisable to
give pertussis vaccine in the first place (contra-indications). . . . She considered that
the Departments . . . had a responsibility also to see that everyone involved had ad-
equate information and guidance on the subject.63
Pugh’s report was significant in that it brought specific cases to the attention of
Parliament and the media. Ashley had chosen the medical stories of four children that,
he argued, showed clear signs of contra-indications that were ignored by doctors at the
time, leading directly to vaccine damage.64 ‘T’ was apparently ‘normal and healthy’ until
he received his second dose of DTP and began having fits. The doctor gave the child a
third dose regardless of the symptoms, and now he was considered ‘severely brain-dam-
aged and ineducable’. ‘M’ had an epileptic mother, but has ‘begun to deteriorate after
immunisation at fourteen months old and by eighteen months had become totally unre-
sponsive’. ‘K’ had been born prematurely, and after receiving her vaccinations had be-
come prone to ‘bouts of screaming’. The final case, ‘R’, had developed a ‘curious jerking
of his left arm’ soon after being vaccinated for the first time, but the issue was dismissed
as unimportant. After the second dose, the child began to have convulsions. The
Commissioner did not agree entirely with the Association’s assertions of cause and ef-
fect, and believed that there was enough information about the benefits and risks of
60See, e.g., correspondence between Fox and the
Heath government in Kew, London: The National
Archives, TNA: MH 154/1053; and with the Wilson/
Callaghan governments in TNA: PIN 35/549.
61Fox, Helen’s Story, 67–70. Early Day Motion 70
(1974–75), for example, had been signed by ‘more
than 50’ MPs by 3 December 1974: ‘That this House
is concerned at the lack of statistics concerning vac-
cine-damaged children: believes that their case for
compensation is at least as just as those children suf-
fering as a result of the thalidomide tragedy; and de-
mands an immediate investigation into the problem’,
Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 882, 3 December
1974, 1514–26.
62For questions from Astley see: ibid., 867, 17 January
1974, 172–5W; ibid., 914, 1 July 1976, 277–8W;
ibid., 924, 17 January 1977, 73–4W and passim. For
questions from Adley see: ibid., 918, 2 November
1976, 547–8W; ibid., 923, 20 December 1976, 240–
59; ibid., 925, 7 February 1977, 575–7W and
passim.`
63‘The Departments’ referred to the Department of
Health and Social Security (and its predecessors in
England and Wales) and the Scottish and Northern
Ireland Offices which had devolved responsibility for
health. Parliamentary Commissioner for
Administration, Sixth Report, Whooping Cough
Vaccination (London: HMSO, 1977), HC571 (1976–
77), 3.
64Peter Hillmore, ‘MP Picks 4 Vaccine Victims for
Fight’, The Guardian, 25 January 1976, 6.
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vaccination in the broad public health sense. Still, he believed that information on ad-
verse reactions was poor, and argued that parents and doctors should be given better ad-
vice on how to spot contra-indications.65
The Government Response
The government resisted early calls for a compensation scheme for the children, despite
showing political sympathy with the Association’s cause. Eventually, however, multiple
pressure points forced action. Not only had the campaign for compensation gathered
pace, it was becoming increasingly clear that the dramatic decline in vaccination rates
was likely to lead to an epidemic in 1978 or 1979.
Ennals made an announcement to the House of Commons in February 1977. The JCVI
had urged him to begin a publicity campaign, but he opted to wait until he had harder
evidence of the vaccine’s safety, on the advice of the Committee for the Safety of
Medicines.66 In his speech, he expressed sympathy for the parents, but argued that any
action on the matter would have to wait for a detailed report from the JCVI on the scien-
tific evidence, and from the Pearson Report on the legal position of any compensatory
scheme.67 Pearson had been used as a delaying tactic throughout the Association’s cam-
paign. Castle, in her first meeting with Fox in May 1974, had suggested referring vaccine
damage to the Royal Commission.68 It also allowed the government to stall (and eventu-
ally fight off) a case in the European Commission of Human Rights that was being
pursued by the Association.69
A series of coinciding factors forced the government into action in the summer of 1977.
The entire vaccination programme was in crisis. Vaccination rates for whooping cough had
declined 59 per cent between 1971 and 1975.70 Pearson was due to publish towards the
end of the year, and would most likely recommend a compensation scheme. Consumer in-
formation group Which? had also made its support for compensation public.71 Further,
Ennals clearly believed that the whole episode was inflicting significant political damage on
the Labour Party. Ashley and the Association had successfully argued their case, and the
government’s lack of action was ‘undermining our reputation as a caring government, and
many of our supporters do not understand why we are resisting a claim which they see as
obviously just’. Since the DHSS had already accepted, privately, that the compensation prin-
ciple was sound, ‘political considerations favour an early announcement . . . rather than
waiting for many months, during which the pressure will build up and the vaccination pro-
gramme . . . further damaged’.72 To give the government confidence, it was also becoming
increasingly clear that respected medical evidence supported the pertussis vaccine.73
65Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration,
Sixth Report, 17–18, 22.
66‘Vaccination Campaign Shelved’, The Guardian, 22
November 1977, 4; ‘Minister Defers Campaign to
Encourage Vaccination’, The Times, 22 November
1974, 2; ‘Vaccine Campaign Launched Soon’, The
Guardian, 8 February 1978, 5.
67Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 925, 8 February
1977, 1227–39.
68‘Bringing the Law up to Scratch’, The Guardian, 7
August 1974.
69Fox, Helen’s Story, 88–90. See also TNA: MH 154/
1057.
70TNA: CAB 129/195/14, Merlyn Rees, Vaccine
Damage, 29 April 1977, 1.
71Hugh Herbert, ‘Which? Backs Vaccine Injury
Compensation’, The Guardian, 13 January 1977, 7.
72TNA: CAB 129/195/16, David Ennals, Payment for
Vaccine Damaged Children, 2 May 1977, 1.
73‘Medicine: Doubts over Vaccine Damage’, The
Times, 26 February 1977, 14; Hugh Herbert, ‘“No
cause for alarm” as Whooping Cough Spreads’, The
Guardian, 26 April 1978.
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The Cabinet resolved to accept the general principle of compensation for victims of
vaccine damage in order to restore faith in the vaccination programme. Partially, this was
to ‘mollify’ Ashley and the Association.74 But it was also designed to play to the wider
public. The belief was that by accepting the compensation principle, it would allay the
fears of parents by showing that if something went wrong the state would protect them.
It was also seen as a sign of strength and confidence. The government was explicitly stat-
ing that it was sure that there were so few cases that it was willing to compensate par-
ents even if they could not definitively prove that vaccines were the sole cause of their
child’s disability.75 On the other hand, it was possible that such action would bring atten-
tion to those rare cases, and give parents cause for concern.76 On balance, the govern-
ment chose to acquiesce to the principle of the Association’s demands, and produce a
solution that was financially affordable and would not open the government up to com-
peting claims for no-fault compensation from other interest groups.77
The government engineered a public exchange of correspondence between Lord
Pearson and James Callaghan, orchestrated by Ennals and Lord Chancellor Frederick
Elwyn-Jones.78 On 6 June 1977, Callaghan wrote:
My ministerial colleagues and I are greatly concerned by the small, but tragic, number
of cases in which vaccination against serious childhood diseases may have caused
damage to the children concerned. . . . It would therefore go far to relieve the anxi-
eties and concern of myself and colleagues, and to restore public confidence, if you
were able to assure me that the Commission will be dealing specifically with the
problem of vaccine damage and to give an indication of your thinking at this stage.79
To which Pearson responded:
I can readily give you the assurance you seek. . . . We see it as a particular part of a
very difficult field with which our Report will have to deal, but we have all reached the
conclusion that some kind of financial assistance should be made available for very seri-
ous injury resulting from vaccination recommended by a public health authority.80
The Association saw Pearson as a victory. While Pugh’s report had been seen as too
tame, Pearson reaffirmed many of the core arguments, especially the one made in the
BMJ in 1973—that is, that if the government was going to encourage all children to be
vaccinated on public health grounds, it should also compensate those rare cases of
74TNA: CAB 128/61/18, CM(77) 18th Conclusions,
Cabinet minutes, 5 May 1977 10.30am, 10.
75TNA: CAB 129/195/14, Vaccine Damage; CAB 129/
195/16, Payment for Vaccine Damaged Children;
Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 925, 8 February
1977, 1227–39.
76TNA: CAB 129/195/14, Vaccine Damage, 1. Similar
views were expressed in a Guardian editorial: ‘Either
Way, the Children still Die’, The Guardian, 12
February 1977.
77TNA: CAB 128/61/18, Cabinet minutes, 5 May 1977,
8–11.
78See TNA: BN 120/10, esp. Lord Elwyn-Jones to James
Callaghan, 20 May 1977; Cabinet Office, Meeting
between Lord Chancellor, Secretary of State for
Social Services and Chief Secretary, Treasury, held 19
May 1977.
79TNA: BN 120/10, James Callaghan to Lord Pearson, 6
June 1977.
80TNA: BN 120/10, Lord Pearson to James Callaghan, 9
June 1977. This exchange was reinforced by a state-
ment by Ennals in the House of Commons:
Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 933, 14 June
1977, 240–1.
A Disability Act? The Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979 13
 at London School of H
ygiene &
 Tropical M
edicine on O
ctober 28, 2016
http://shm
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
damage that followed.81 Although the report only briefly covered vaccination policy (six
pages out of 545), it acknowledged that almost every expert voice on the matter agreed
that there was a moral case for compensation. ‘Nobody argued in the contrary sense.’82
The Government was forced to produce legislation quickly as the 1979 General
Election was looming.83 Callaghan had already ordered that the scheme should be
planned in the background to ensure it could be brought to the House as quickly after
Pearson’s publication as possible.84 This meant that the drafting was essentially com-
plete, and cross-party support for the Bill ensured that the passage through the Houses
of Parliament became a formality.85 The resulting Act showed some very clear choices on
the part of the DHSS which cannot be explained outside of the realm of disability policy.
As the full title states, this was:
An Act to provide for payments to be made out of public funds in cases where severe
disablement occurs as a result of vaccination against certain diseases or of contact
with a person who has been vaccinated against any of those diseases.86
‘Severe disablement’ is, obviously, a reference to disability; the definition was based on
long-standing medico-legal practice that had only recently been reaffirmed with the
1975 expansion of disability benefits. Thus, a person qualified for payment if they ‘[suf-
fered] disablement to the extent of 80 per cent. or more, assessed as for the purposes of
section 57 of the Social Security Act 1975’.87 The idea of ‘percentage of disablement’
came from the Industrial Injuries and War Pensions schemes from before the Second
World War. The Disability Alliance favoured this system as a way of determining pay-
ments based on need for all disabled people, though in this respect they differed from
DIG’s wider National Disability Income Scheme.88 The concept is, however, rooted in
older medical definitions of disability. Percentage of disablement was designed to deter-
mine the effects on an adult being able to find employment ‘of a kind which apart from
that injury, disease or deformity would be suited to his age, experience and qualifica-
tions’.89 The degree of disablement was measured against ‘a person of the same age
and sex whose physical and mental condition is normal’ by a medical practitioner, who
would provide a written assessment for the social security authorities.90 Transposing this
concept onto children was not unheard of, despite the potential difficulties in applying
such measures of disablement.91 By choosing 80 per cent—a generally accepted level of
81For allegations that the Pugh report was too tame see:
Gillian Linscott, ‘“Frail” Vaccine Report Disappoints
Parents’, The Guardian, 28 October 1972, 2.
82Pearson, Royal Commission, para. 1397, 296.
83An election had to be called by October as it had
been five years since the previous one, but it would
be brought forward by a vote of no confidence in
March 1979. Parliamentary Debates (Commons)
965, 28 March 1979, 461–590.
84TNA: CAB 128/61/18, Cabinet minutes, 5 May 1977,
10–11.
85TNA: BN 13/360; The Bill got its second reading on 5
February and received Royal Assent on 22 March,
days before the no-confidence vote. Parliamentary
Debates (Commons) 962, 5 February 1979; ibid.,
964, 22 March 1979, 1760.
86Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979.
87Ibid., c. 1, para. 4. In Northern Ireland it references
the Social Security (Northern Ireland) Act 1975.
88Disability Alliance, Poverty and Disability; DIG,
Creating a National Disability Income.
89Definition of ‘disablement’, used in all subsequent
Acts until the Disability Discrimination Act 1995.
Disabled Persons (Employment) Act 1944, c. 1.
90Social Security Act 1975, Schedule 8.
91Paul Abberley, ‘Counting Us Out: A Discussion of the
OPCS Disability Surveys’, Disability, Handicap &
Society, 1992, 7, 139–155; Glenn T. Fujiura and
Violet Rutkowski-Kmitta, ‘Counting Disability’, in
Albrecht et al., eds, Handbook of Disability Studies,
69–96.
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‘severe disablement’ that would also be used when Severe Disablement Allowance was
introduced in 1984—the government also made a decision that only the ‘most in need’
would receive benefit.92 This was a traditional tactic in restricting access to new benefits,
with the DHSS and the Treasury often wary of opening the door to an avalanche of
claims, and a seemingly exponential rise in public expenditure over time.93
It remains clear that the Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979 could not have operated
without the legal framework of disability that had been established over decades of legis-
lation. Indeed, the restrictions on access were defended by reference to the supposed im-
provements in disability policy over the past decade. The Act was originally intended as
an interim measure—the Labour government specifically brought it to Parliament with
the caveat that once final recommendations on vaccines safety from JCVI were available
(and Person had been fully digested) that there would be follow-up legislation to create a
more comprehensive Act.94 This was in part a defence of the relatively low sum of money
available: £10,000 was not considered enough by campaigners to truly cover the costs of
caring for a severely disabled child over its lifetime. Yet this was also countered by refer-
ence to recent improvements in the general state of disability benefits.95 After the gen-
eral election, Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government used the defence that it
planned to improve life for all disabled people and was not willing to give more special
treatment to a group that already benefited hugely over other equally disabled people.96
Once again, the Act and its implementation were rooted in disability policy, legally and
politically.
The Significance of the Act
By looking at the historical and political context of the Vaccine Damage Payments Act,
we can see more clearly why this specific piece of legislation was passed. Winning the
medical argument through the Medical Research Council and JCVI evidence was not
enough. A political statement needed to be made that accorded with public opinion and
concern over the vaccination programme in general. The provisions contained within the
Act were relatively cheap, a welcome relief in the economic circumstances. Initial esti-
mates predicted only around 300 to 500 initial claims, followed by 14 to 70 claims per
year thereafter. On the basis of £25,000 lump-sum payments, this would have cost
around £10 million, and then £350,000 to £1,750,000 per annum.97 In the end, only
£10,000 was awarded to each of 349 children in 1979 and 255 in 1980, before the claim
92For the Severe Disablement Allowance levels of disable-
ment see: Health and Social Security Act 1984, c. 11.
93Millward, ‘Invalid Definitions, Invalid Responses’. See
also Stone’s work on how disability schemes tend to
grow as pressure builds from within: Deborah A.
Stone, The Disabled State (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1984); Deborah A. Stone,
‘Physicians as Gatekeepers’, Public Policy, 1979, 27,
227–54.
94JCVI published its recommendations in 1981, along
with data on the effectiveness of the vaccine. See
DHSS et al., Whooping Cough; Anon., ‘Efficacy of
Pertussis Vaccination in England’, Br Med J., 1982,
285, 357–39; R. Alderslade, Department of Health
and Social Security, and Middlesex Hospital Medical
School, National Childhood Encephalopathy Study
(London: Middlesex Hospital Medical School, 1981).
95Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 962, 5 February
1979, 32–86.
96TNA: BN 124/20, Norman Fowler to Fox, 4 March
1983; Margaret Thatcher to Fox, (?)20 April 1982;
TNA: PIN 35/549, Gerard Vaughan to Fox, 22
September 1980; Parliamentary Debates (Commons)
977, 22 January, 163W.
97TNA: CAB 129/195/14, Vaccine Damage, Annex.
A Disability Act? The Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979 15
 at London School of H
ygiene &
 Tropical M
edicine on O
ctober 28, 2016
http://shm
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
rate fell significantly.98 It was also seen, to quote Ennals, as ‘one essentially of political
judgement’. Vaccination was not compulsory in Britain, and it would be possible to argue
that these cases affected the tiniest of minorities.99 Still, if the Association’s campaign
had continued, Ennals believed that ‘the vaccination programme can be got going
again’. It was ‘vital’ that it were, ‘because of the possibility of an outbreak of poliomyelitis
this summer—an event for which many people would lay responsibility at the
Government’s door’.100 The Act, and pronouncements leading to it, were part of a spe-
cific political response to a particular public threat.
The Association’s success was due to a number of factors, many of which are seen as
typical of the campaigning landscape at the time. The use of more professionalised re-
search, exploitation of media coverage and the creation of key allies in positions of power
greatly aided the parents’ cause.101 The relationship between Rosemary Fox and Jack
Ashley MP was central to this. Ashley had experience in precisely this sort of campaign
for medical compensation following thalidomide. Cabinet spoke about the Association
and Ashley in the same breath, referring to ‘Mr Ashley’s campaign’.102 Recent develop-
ments in disability policy cannot be ignored in explaining how these issues came to be
recognised by the public as worthy of discussion. Social security payments were seen at
this time as logical responses to social injustices; and disabled people were seen as wor-
thy recipients of new benefit schemes. There were also a number of parliamentarians
able to articulate these points. In many ways, the Association was unlike DIG and the
Disability Alliance for its dogged focus on one specific benefit for a special medical case.
However, it clearly benefited from many of the successes of those organisations, drawing
on their tactics and building on their political arguments.
For it should be noted that The Association won the moral argument, and won it early.
The only scientific debate to be won was to prove that vaccine damage existed. It man-
aged to provide hundreds of potential examples, enough to spread doubt among the
public and to win support for a compensation scheme. Pugh’s report, coupled with news-
paper coverage of the medical doubts of Dick, Stewart and Wilson made vaccine damage
a fact. It took the government three years to publicly announce that it accepted the thrust
of the Association’s argument, as a direct result of the public pressure Fox and her allies
had generated.103 This cannot be separated from the wider medical scare, but it reem-
phasises Drakeford and Butler’s claims that scandals have to be articulated and pur-
sued.104 No person or body ever provided enough evidence to overturn the initial MRC
trials; and two years later the completed review by the JCVI reaffirmed the medical estab-
lishment’s position.105 Without the wider focus on the political pressures of the period,
we cannot explain why this particular medical debate became a full-blown ‘scandal’.
98While the value of the award would be scaled up at
points over the proceeding decade to combat the ef-
fects of inflation, the number of claims remained rel-
atively low. A total of 74 successful claims were
made in 1981; 42 in 1983; 29 in 1984; 26 in 1985;
15 in 1986 and 10 up to December 1987. See
Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 124, 18
December 1987, 931W.
99TNA: CAB 128/61/18, Cabinet minutes 5 May 1977,
8–11.
100TNA: CAB 129/195/16, Payment for vaccine dam-
aged children, 1.
101See: Whiteley and Winyard, Pressure for the Poor.
102CAB 128/61/18, Cabinet minutes 5 May 1977, 8.
103See Ennals’ arguments in CAB 12/195.16, Payment
for vaccine damaged children.
104Drakeford and Butler, ‘Everyday Tragedies’.
105DHSS et al., Whooping Cough; Baker, ‘The Pertussis
Vaccine Controversy’.
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By establishing that there was a policy problem and generating the political will to rec-
tify it, a solution needed to be found.106 Developments in disability benefits over the de-
cade provided the bureaucratic tools for this. Since the late 1960s, the DHSS had been
planning for a number of disability benefits. Even after the Social Security Benefits Act
1975, it had continued to be involved in developing a scheme for disabled drivers to pur-
chase cars.107 Alfred Morris had established an Interdepartmental Group on Disablement
within government, and the Sharp Report, Silver Jubilee Committee and Committee on
Restrictions Against Disabled People were considering social rights issues with regard to
access to businesses and services.108 In short, the British government had created the
tools necessary for dealing with disability issues, both in the form of a bureaucratic appa-
ratus for investigating policy solutions and the legal precedents of previous schemes. As
we have also seen, concerns surrounding thalidomide had led to the introduction of
medical issues in the Pearson Report. Thus, even if the decline in public support for vacci-
nation is seen as a medical issue, the response cannot be explained outside the disability
and social security politics of the late 1970s.
And yet, it must be stressed that most of the other disability organisations and cam-
paigners of the period wrote very little about vaccine damage compensation. Disability
studies activists, where they have written historical analyses of the 1970s, have focused
on the battles they themselves fought. Since many of them were involved in DPOs such
as the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation and the British Council of
Organisations of Disabled People, such legislation was neither part of their remit, nor was
it a core constituent of the wider struggle for disabled people’s civil rights.109 Moreover,
while the scheme is still running, very few disabled people received payments as a pro-
portion of all the disabled people in the United Kingdom.110 Even at the time, organisa-
tions such as the Disability Alliance had covered Pearson in great detail and submitted
evidence; but it had focused on industrial injuries compensation, not mentioning vaccina-
tion at all.111 Vaccine damage, then, occupies an interesting analytical hinterland, being
106See Kingdon’s work on policy making and agenda
setting: Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public
Policies.
107TNA: BN 59/75.
108For examples of the Interdepartmental Group on
Disablement and of cabinet sub-committee discus-
sions Morris led, see TNA: CAB 134/3845; CAB 134/
4036; CAB 134/4235; MH 154/848; and passim.
Evelyn Adelaide Sharp chaired the Sharp Report,
published as Mobility of Physically Disabled People
(London: HMSO, 1974). The Silver Jubilee
Committee was chaired by Peter Large and its re-
port published as ‘Can Disabled People Go Where
You Go?’: Report by the Silver Jubilee Committee
on Improving Access for Disabled People (London:
HMSO, 1979). See also: Committee on Restrictions
Against Disabled People, Report (London: HMSO,
1982).
109Campbell and Oliver, Disability Politics; Michael
Oliver and Colin Barnes, The New Politics of
Disablement (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2012).
110Only 843 payments had been made in total from
the Vaccine Damage Payments scheme up to
December 1987. By contrast, over one million peo-
ple were claiming invalidity benefit at any one time
in 1987/88. See Parliamentary Debates (Commons)
124, 18 December 1987, 931W. There were an av-
erage of 1,067,000 claimants at any one time of in-
validity benefit, the main National Insurance
unemployment benefit for disabled people, in the fi-
nancial year 1987/88. Department of Work and
Pensions, Benefit Expenditure Tables, 2013 <http://
statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd4/expenditure_tables_
Budget_2013.xls>, accessed 12 June 2013.
111The Disability Alliance’s files in the Peter Townsend
Collection at the University of Essex cover this pe-
riod in great detail. See especially: Peter Townsend
Collection, University of Essex, Colchester: 79.03, ‘A
note about the Pearson Commission Report’, Peter
Townsend 16 June 1978; 77.02, Disability Alliance
Steering Group minutes, 29 June 1978, 1.
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both rooted in the disability politics and policy of the 1970s, while seemingly ignored as a
disability issue by many of its contemporaries. This again stresses the need to look beyond
solely medical readings of the pertussis vaccine scare. It also should make historians
aware of the need to acknowledge that medical definitions of disability—while rejected
by social model advocates as politically illegitimate—offer a useful lens for understanding
and framing the decisions and attitudes of institutions in the past.
Conclusions
The Association’s success quickly turned sour. Between 1974 and 1977, it won the moral
argument for compensation, and legislation soon followed. After 1977, however, the fo-
cus shifted back towards public health. JCVI had warned of a potential whooping cough
epidemic for 1978 or 1979, and when it hit, the Association and Jack Ashley took much
of the blame.112 Dr Tony Smith in the The Times argued that while the press should have
been more responsible in providing a balanced review of the evidence, it was the atten-
tion drawn by the Association that had caused the controversy.113 The JCVI and Office of
Population Censuses and Surveys went further, arguing that the Association was to
blame for scaring parents.114 Ashley was forced to refute at the time and many years
later that he opposed vaccination, making it very clear that he and his colleagues sup-
ported the national programme and believed declining vaccination rates were worri-
some.115 Such was the volatility of public opinion on the matter that in the summer of
1978 the government reported a shortage of whooping cough vaccine owing to the rush
from parents who had previously opted out.116 In some ways, this marked a new medical
scandal—not surrounding the failure of government protection against vaccine damage,
but of its failure to protect against infectious disease. As Baker has shown, the targets of
opprobrium were not a complacent medical establishment, but those who undermined
the vaccination programme through scaremongering.117
The Vaccine Damage Payments Act was just a part of the government’s response to
the pertussis vaccine scare. Ostensibly, it was designed to restore faith in the vaccination
programme, allowing the state to resume its protective policies against infectious disease.
But the specific form of this legislation and the way in which the campaigns for compen-
sation were run owed a lot to the context of disability and social security developments
over the course of the 1970s. The government had to act in such a way that took note of
the economic conditions of the time, as well as public attitudes towards medical risk, vac-
cination and notions of the role of the state in protecting and providing for disabled
112Reports of declining vaccination rates and increased
risk of epidemic were published across the winter of
1977/78. See for example: ‘Whooping Cough
Vaccinations Fall’, The Guardian, 23 November
1977, 4; ‘Whooping Cough Could Sweep Britain’,
The Guardian, 10 December 1977, 24; ‘The Omens
so Far Are Bad—These Could be the First Ripples of
a Whooping Cough Wave’, The Guardian, 25
January 1978, 9.
113Dr Tony Smith, ‘Clearing the Doubts over
Whooping Cough’, The Times, 18 August 1978, 12.
114Melanie Phillips, ‘Row over Cause of Whooping
Cough Outbreak’, The Guardian, 9 August 1978, 3.
115Ashley, Acts of Defiance. See also Parliamentary
Debates (Commons) 962, 5 February 1979, 33;
Parliamentary Debates (Lords) 551, 12 January
1994, 125. Fox and the Association were also keen
to emphasise that they were not anti-vaccination,
but were looking for more informed choice and
compensation for those injured:‘Mary McCormack,
‘The Hazards of Health’, 11; ‘Bringing the Law up to
Scratch’, The Guardian, 7 August 1974.
116‘Whooping Cough Vaccine “almost run out”’, The
Times, 16 December 1977, 2.
117Baker, ‘The Pertussis Vaccine Controversy’, esp.
4006.
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people. Yet there is a paradox here for historians. Despite being seen as largely a matter
of medical and public health policy, the responses to the pertussis scare were rooted in
the context of disability and social security policy of the 1970s. It is clear that medical his-
torians need to pay closer attention to the disability issues; and by the same token,
disability historians can learn much from re-examining the Act using the skills they have
developed over the past 20 years. This will begin to provide a wider view of the pertussis
vaccine scare as a social phenomenon, and not just one of crisis within the public health
profession.
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